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in light of Pietroski’s criticisms. I explore an alternative view that fol-
lows Pietroski in putting emphasis on the relation of meanings to con-
cepts, but makes some room for truth conditions.
Keywords: Lexical meaning, quantifi ers, concepts, minimalist pro-
gram, language faculty.
Paul Pietroski’s book Conjoining Meanings (Pietroski 2018) is the cul-
mination of a long research project.1 The goals of the project are ambi-
tious. One is to offer a forceful and thorough challenge to the program 
of truth-conditional semantics; indeed, Pietroski’s goal is to convince 
us to give up on this project. Semantics is a broad fi eld, and maybe it 
is fool-hardy to try to say what the dominant approach to semantics is, 
but in the areas of formal linguistics and philosophy of language, the 
truth-conditional program is central, mainstream, and perhaps seen 
as the only game in town. Pietroski challenges that program from the 
very perspective of formal linguistics and philosophy of language, so 
his challenge is all the more powerful. But in addition, Pietroski offers 
us an alternative approach, that does away not only with truth condi-
tions, but a great deal of the formal apparatus that typically goes with 
truth-conditional semantics; especially, does away with type theory.
1 Building on such work as Pietroski (2003, 2005, 2010, 2012).
* Thanks to Ernie Lepore and Paul Pietroski for extended discussions of Paul’s 
work during a reading group we held in 2019. Thanks also to John Collins for many 
discussions of ideas closely related to Paul’s.
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One of the important features of Pietroski’s positive proposal is a 
link between meanings and concepts. Pietroski’s proposal thus offers a 
certain rather specifi c kind of internalism about meaning, in line with 
a broadly Chomskian view of the language faculty and the place of se-
mantics in it.
For some time now, I have been working on a project that was al-
ways inspired by Pietroski’s work; and especially, agrees with the gen-
eral idea that meanings involve relations between words and concepts. 
But unlike Pietroski, I have offered this project as a way of supporting 
a limited form of truth-conditional semantics, and showing how truth-
conditional semantics can interact fruitfully with the broader cognitive 
sciences.2
You might imagine two builders assessing an old and much-loved 
building that is showing signs of falling over. I fi nd myself suggesting 
that if we shore up the foundations and do some structural repairs, we 
can keep an old lovely building in its glory. Pietroski, we might say, 
suggests that the case is hopeless, and the responsible thing to do is to 
knock it down and put up something better in its place.
To continue our metaphor. The strange thing is I have repeatedly 
found, when Pietroski and I make our proposals to the client, that I get 
asked what the difference in result really is. In this short note, I shall 
try to illustrate a few of the key differences. I shall not really try to 
argue which is right, just explain where there are choices.
1.  Agreeing and agreeing to disagree
There is one point where Pietroski and I agree fully. We have both 
emphasized the importance of concepts for lexical meaning. The idea 
here is simple and familiar. A child learning their language must learn 
to associate the sound / dɔɡ / with a meaning. It is a common assump-
tion in a great deal of work on language acquisition that they do so by 
associating that sound with a concept, DOG. Thus, the main thing that 
gives the meaning of dog is the concept DOG.
As a kind of motivating idea, there is much to like about this pro-
posal. But, there are many many reasons to be dissatisfi ed with it in 
detail.3 Depending on what one means by ‘concept’ this might be far 
too narrow an idea to account for the range of word meanings. And of 
course, the implicit supposition in the story is that the learner has the 
concept already in place, and then associates a sound with it. That may 
be true in some cases, but it is dubious as an explanation of all our word 
leaning.
All of those are points where Pietroski and I are happy to agree, 
both about what is easy and hard about the main idea. There is, how-
2 For instance, Glanzberg (2011, 2014, 2018).
3 A nice illustration is a handbook article by Clark (1983), who uses the idea as 
an introduction, but almost immediately takes it back.
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ever, one point of likely disagreement over this leading idea. Pietroski 
is friendly to a kind of Fodorian atomism about concepts (Fodor 1975, 
1998), while I have stressed the importance of the internal structure of 
concepts for how concepts relate to truth-conditional semantics (Glanz-
berg 2018). For this discussion, I shall simply put aside this difference.4
Another point of disagreement is much more central, but I shall 
also put it aside for now. A great deal of Pietroski’s view is motivated 
by issues of polysemy. Because of this, he most defi nitely does not say 
that we link a sound to a single concept. Rather, we link a sound to an 
address, at which a cluster of concepts is stored. Any one of them may 
be selected. Hence, we get for most every word, a family of polysemous 
meanings. This is important, as many of Pietroski’s arguments against 
truth-conditional semantics stem from problems of polysemy. I shall 
set this issue aside too. Not because I think it is a small matter, but 
because I think there are a range of issues to focus on once we resolve 
polysemy.
There are also, of course, questions about how much internalism 
about meaning is correct. Both Pietroski and I are opting for some-
thing more internalist than many philosophers would expect (though 
many cognitive scientists would fi nd entirely obvious). I think there are 
interesting questions about how far the internalist motivations about 
meaning go, but again, I shall not pursue them here.
There is another family of issues that I think is well worth pursu-
ing, and is important to Pietroski’s work, but I shall not explore in any 
depth here. This is the family of issues about what the right tools are 
for semantics. In particular, as Pietroski rightly notes, a great deal of 
truth-conditional semantics, perhaps since Montague (1973) and cer-
tainly since Partee (1975), is done using the apparatus of the simple 
theory of types, and the treatment of variables in semantics is broadly 
Tarskian, in the tradition of Tarski (1935).5 Pietroski gives an extended 
discussion of why he fi nds this to be a fundamental mistake.
Here, I do disagree, but again, I shall not say much about why. To 
go back to our metaphor of the builders, this is an important issue be-
tween builders, but not of much interest to the client. Which tools work, 
which are dangerous, and what they produce is important to builders, 
but it is only of interest to the client to the extent that they produce 
visibly different results.
Another point along these lines is about the technical issue of lexi-
cal decomposition. I have described my view of the lexicon as a ‘pointers 
and packaging’ approach, which has each lexical entry point to a con-
cept, but also contain a great deal of specifi cally grammatical structure 
that ‘packages’ the concept into a word meaning (Glanzberg 2018). For 
illustration’s sake, I have presented this in the form of a lexical de-
4 For an overview of work on concepts, see Murphy (2002).
5 Some programs make even strong use of type theory. See, for instance, van 
Benthem (1991).
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composition, following the tradition of Dowty (1979) and more recently 
Rappaport Hovav and Levin (1998). Pietroski again disagrees, but in a 
specifi c technical way. He does not have much (if any) packaging in the 
lexicon. But, he has a great deal of syntax that builds complex ‘words’ 
from simpler roots, following a different tradition, from Borer (2005), 
Hale and Keyser (2002), and Ramchand (2008). So, he does not really 
reject all packaging, but does put it in a different place. There are lots 
of questions here, both empirical and methodological. But again, they 
are more a matter between builders than for the client.
What I think is of interest to the client is what the result is. In this 
case, if we think that meanings link to concepts in the right way, and 
that concepts are at fi rst pass internal mental representations, what is 
left for truth-conditional semantics?
2. Go  fetch?
Pietroski’s core idea is that meanings are instructions to, as he puts it, 
fetch a concept from a given address in long-term memory. As I noted, 
he argues that at any such address is a family of concepts, but still the 
main semantic instruction is, as he puts it fetch. To fi ll in a little more, 
each lexical item gives an instruction to fetch a concept at an address, 
so the meaning of cow is the instruction fetch@cow. Find the address 
linked to cow, and fetch a concept from there.
The issue I want to focus on is what fetches. For Pietroski, that is 
the core semantic operation. So, any meaningful morpheme will fetch. 
I shall suggest another way to look at this.
As is well-known, ‘words’—morphemes, lexemes, or whatever our 
theory tell us to use—come in two classes. There are open and closed 
classes, and maybe a few in-between. Open classes are just they sound 
like: open. We can add to them as our hearts and interests desire. In 
English, and many languages, these correspond to the major lexical 
categories: nouns, verbs, and adjectives/adverbs. We can add nouns 
and verbs easily. Examples are familiar. Carburator, transistor, trans-
duce are relatively late additions to English. Looking at the Oxford 
English Dictionary’s new word list for 2020 I found ‘hend’, adv. and 
prep., sense 2: “In a diligent or skillful manner; adeptly, nimbly”.6 (Ap-
parently some link to older phrases for knighthood.) The open classes of 
words grow, and they seem to grow along with our concepts. Discover-
ing the concepts of transduction or mitosis help us to make the words 
transducer and mitosis.
But there are also closed-class words. Expressions that give us 
tenses, quantifi ers, moods, and a number of other ‘grammatical’ terms 
form stable classes, that do not change; or if they do, they change at 
the glacial pace of grammatical change. We cannot add a new tense or 
quantifi er to our languages the way we can add a new noun or verb. 
6 Accessed at https://public.oed.com/updates/new-words-list-january-2020/.
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Perhaps the more natural class here is what linguists call functional 
items. These are roughly grammatical elements, like tenses, moods, 
quantifi ers, but also number markers, light verbs, and many more. 
They overlap with the closed classes more or less. (Whether pronouns 
or prepositions are functional can be argued. That is perhaps the main 
potential difference.)
There are two hypotheses we can entertain about the functional ex-
pressions, and this marks an important point of difference between my 
view and Pietroski’s. One option is that functional elements fetch con-
cepts, like most other morphemes. I think this is Pietroski’s view. Now, 
these need not be entirely ordinary fetches. The addresses at which 
these expressions fetch may have a more limited or more specialized 
range of concepts. So, we may fi nd less polysemy. The concepts involved 
may have different sources than other concepts, and they may be spe-
cial in other ways. Pietroski explores these questions in depth. But in 
the end, the semantic job of a functional expression is to fetch.
There is another option, and it is one I have endorsed. Functional el-
ements do not fetch. In effect, their meanings are part of the grammar, 
and we not need to fetch anything extra-grammatical to provide them.
To make this clear, let me say a little more about another very high-
level assumption that is common across Pietroski and me. We both 
adopt a broadly Chomskian view of language. This is far too big an 
issue to state quickly. But the main idea is clear enough. There is a 
language faculty. This is a part of human cognition. It is a distinctive 
cognitive system. It is one that is substantially innate. Most impor-
tantly, it is one whose principles and parameters make up Universal 
Grammar (Chomsky 1986, 2000; Collins 2004).
So, with this background, we can ask a reasonably clear question 
about what is part of grammar: what is encoded in the language fac-
ulty. It should be clear enough that the full force of Chomsky’s views 
is not really required to ask this question. So, for instance, just what 
is innate is not immediately at stake. Any reasonably strong domain-
specifi city for grammar will suffi ce, but Chomsky’s views are common 
ground between Pietroski and me, so we might as well go for the stron-
ger hypothesis.7
With this idea in mind, we can think about fetch-ing. As I under-
stand it, this operation asks an expression to link to something outside 
of the language faculty proper. This is not surprising with lexical items. 
The source of words like carburator is not our native linguistic ability, 
it is our extra-linguistic ability to build, think about, and then talk 
about, cars and their parts. So, the instruction to fetch@carburator is 
a link to something outside the language faculty.
As I have said, I think this is plausible, with some minor disagree-
ments, for the major lexical categories. But should we extend it to the 
7 For some thoughts on domain-specifi city, see among a huge literature Hirschfeld 
and Gelman (1994), and the many references therein.
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functional ones? Here we reach the fi rst point of disagreement I shall 
highlight. I, and many proponents of truth-conditional semantics with-
in a Chomskian framework, would argue that the meanings of some 
functional elements are within the language faculty, and so are strictly 
part of grammar.
A second question is what the meanings of those sorts of expressions 
are like. Functional expressions are the ones that are discussed in most 
detail in standard expositions of truth-conditional semantics. It is thus 
a well-motivated hypothesis that the tools and methods of truth-condi-
tional semantics are the right ones to describe their meanings. The two 
ideas combine, to indicate that substantial parts of truth-conditional 
semantics describe parts of grammar, by describing the meanings of 
the functional elements.
We thus seem to have a very stark difference in views. On the one 
hand, we have a language faculty fi lled with semantics in a truth-con-
ditional style. Perhaps not as much as some views of semantics might 
suppose, but nonetheless, a rich semantics within the language faculty. 
On the other, we have a highly restricted language faculty, with a very 
few semantic operations, whose main job is to access extra-linguistic 
concepts, and combine them in simple ways.
But as we begin to look at what differences these two starkly differ-
ent pictures make in practice, it becomes harder to distinguish them. 
The point is illustrated from both sides. From my pro-truth-condi-
tions side, I freely admit that the notion of truth conditions is being 
stretched rather far. All I claimed is that the familiar apparatus of 
truth-conditional semantics, applied carefully to specifi c points, is use-
ful. As is well-known, this apparatus is quite rich and fl exible, and so 
one might well ask how substantial such a general claim is. At the 
same time, from Pietroski’s side, we see a range of concepts that are 
closely tied to grammar, like closure operators and indices, and so on. 
Of these, Pietroski comments that we fi nd “expressions that can be 
used to build T-concepts, which bear an intimate relation to certain 
truth-evaluable thoughts” (316). And in a number of cases the glosses 
on those concepts are close in nature to what the truth-conditional pro-
gram would say. For instance, Pietroski (with due caution) endorses a 
Reichenbachian account of tense. This is one among several that can 
be articulated with standard truth-conditional apparatus. So, in the 
abstract we might clearly distinguish between a semantically rich lan-
guage faculty or a semantically minimal one. But in practice, we see 
something much harder to identify: it might be a rich language faculty 
which makes special and partial use of truth-conditional apparatus, 
or a semantically sparse language faculty that creates strong links to 
extra-linguistic concepts that have exactly the same truth-conditional 
properties.
Let us look at one specifi c case: quantifi ers. This is a good case for 
my side, as most any textbook on truth-conditional semantics will have 
 M. Glanzberg, But Without …? 359
a great deal to say about quantifi ers.8 Even more, Partee (2015) marks 
discovering the importance of quantifi ers as a major event in the devel-
opment of semantics in generative grammar. I myself have used quan-
tifi ers as an example of where we get strong truth-conditional results 
(Glanzberg 2014).
The classic theory of determiner meanings as generalized quantifi -
ers from the early 1980s (Barwise and Cooper 1981; Keenan and Stavi 
1986; Higginbotham and May 1981) was indeed an impressive achieve-
ment. It offers us meanings for the interesting closed class of determin-
ers (in languages like Germanic ones that have lots of determiners). We 
get meanings for English all, some, most, few, …. And of course, we get 
them couched in the mechanisms of truth-conditional semantics.
Here again, there are a number of questions we should pause to ask. 
Though generalized quantifi er theory was an important step, a great 
deal of more recent work, both empirically and theoretically oriented, 
has shown its limits and weaknesses. It is by no means that last word 
on the semantics of quantifi ers.9 And again, Pietroski does not disagree 
on the basic meanings of quantifi er expressions, nor on the need for 
some grammar to go with quantifi ers (movement, indices, etc.). So, 
again, where does the larger disagreement show up in practice?
There are a number of more theory-specifi c points where disagree-
ment becomes sharper. One is about what machinery to use to give the 
meanings of quantifi ers. Standard generalized quantifi er theory is em-
bedded in the simple theory of types, which Pietroski fi nds unreason-
ably powerful. He observes that the familiar meanings for many gener-
alized quantifi ers can also be given in monadic second-order logic. He 
prefers the Boolos-inspired plural interpretation of second-order logic. 
I, in contrast, worry that second-order logic itself is far too powerful, 
even under the plural interpretation. As is well know, second-order 
logic has a sentence of pure logic that is a logical truth just in case the 
continuum hypothesis of set theory is true, for instance (see Shapiro 
1991). So here, at least within two research programs, we have a genu-
ine difference in what tools to use.10 There are also some interesting 
questions about how to explain some important facts about quantifi er 
meaning, such as the well-known conservativity constraint. A common 
idea is that this is a semantic universal, and so is simply ‘hard-wired’ 
into the language faculty (cf. von Fintel and Matthewson 2008). This 
is not really much of an explanation, of course; rather, a claim that no 
further explanation will be found. Pietroski is not satisfi ed with this 
view, and makes a (tentative) suggestion about how a better explana-
tion might be found.
8 Heim and Kratzer (1998) is a much-cited example, but most semantics textbooks 
do the same.
9 See Beghelli and Stowell (1997), Landman (2004), Reinhart (1997), Szabolcsi 
(2010), and Wellwood (2019), among many others.
10 See Boolos (1984), and for subsequent discussion, see Shapiro (1991) and 
critical discussion by Jané (2009).
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But what we fi nd here is not disagreement on the basic meanings of 
quantifi ers, and between Pietroski and me, not really much disagree-
ment about the grammar either. Again, we fi nd two sorts of disagree-
ment. One is about tools: where they work, how to use them. This is 
very much a theory-internal kind of disagreement. To return to the 
builders metaphor yet again, it is a disagreement that is mostly be-
tween builders. Our client may not really care. The other is about big-
picture issues about what is part of grammar proper. But again, we 
may fi nd that our client does not really see the difference in practice, 
and may not worry about it quite to the extent that we do.
3. Get  with the program?
My brief and casual discussion of a few differences between Pietroski’s 
view and my own reveal two sorts of differences. On the detailed, theo-
ry-internal side, there are lots of questions about which methods, tools, 
and analyses are correct. Here, Pietroski argues in favor of a radical de-
parture from the truth-conditional program, while I argue for judicious 
modifi cation to keep the truth-conditional approach. In her elegant re-
view of Pietroski (2018), Ramchand (2020) suggests many of us will 
respond to Pietroski’s taking our beloved truth-conditional semantics 
from us by going through stages of grief. She identifi es a bargaining 
stage, and it would appear I am offering to do just that kind of bargain-
ing. I shall, as she puts it, use the traditional tools of truth-conditional 
semantics, but where and how they work best. I indeed am bargaining, 
but I think the bargain is a good one.
I suppose I also hold out some more optimism for the prognosis of 
the patient. Where Pietroski (and Ramchand) are sure the situation is 
grave, I keep hoping for a turn-around. So, I am more optimistic than 
Pietroski about how the internal structure of concepts can yield exten-
sions, and more optimistic about fi tting a restricted range of empiri-
cally robust composition principles within a type-theoretic framework. 
It is easier to bargain when you feel optimistic about the outcomes.
The other major point of disagreement is more abstract; perhaps more 
philosophical than methodological or empirical. As I mentioned, my pre-
ferred view ends up with a language faculty that is rather rich in seman-
tics, and includes a great deal of truth-conditional apparatus. Pietroski 
ends up with a very different result. His language faculty has little se-
mantics beyond fetch. Where I see semantically rich elements of gram-
mar, Pietroski sees elements of grammar that fetch in specifi c ways.
I think it is helpful to frame this disagreement in terms of some recent 
thinking about syntax, and more widely, grammar. I have in mind the 
minimalist program, following, among many authors, Chomsky (1995, 
2000), or Hornstein (1995). The minimalist program, as a research pro-
gram, has many components. Some are developments in syntax that 
have received broad acceptance across a range of approaches to syntax 
and semantics. Others are more ambitious, and more controversial.
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Pietroski endorses the general idea of keeping the language faculty 
as simple as possible; in particular, to posit as limited a range of op-
erations within the language faculty as possible. He is careful not to 
endorse any particular version of the minimalist program, though he 
is clearly sympathetic. He writes “I do fi nd “minimalist” conceptions of 
syntax attractive on empirical and conceptual grounds” (295).
But, within work in the minimalist tradition, we can fi nd a very stark 
view of what goes into the language faculty, and such a view makes the 
difference between Pietroski’s position and my own equally stark. An 
example can be found in Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002). They offer 
a proposal about what they call the faculty of human language—nar-
row sense, which is extremely minimal. According to their view, it is 
little more than an engine that supports recursion, with only whatever 
combinatorial apparatus is needed to enable recursion. Presumably, 
that includes something like merge as described by other minimalist 
work, and not much more. It is easy to see that the kinds of semantic 
mechanisms I have suggested belong to the language faculty are highly 
unlikely to be part of this sparse faculty. It is much more likely that the 
kinds of mechanisms that Pietroski proposes could be part of it.
Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002) also discuss what they call the 
faculty of human language—broad sense which includes some central 
interface systems, including interfaces with conceptual-intentional and 
sensory-motor systems. It is not an accident that a fair bit of what tra-
ditionally falls within the scope of linguistics falls within the broad, but 
not the narrow, faculty. The narrow faculty is an extremely minimal 
recursion engine.
The faculty of human language—narrow sense gives us a very stark 
picture of what is core to human language. The more we think that is 
central to grammar, the more unlikely the semantically rich language 
faculty I have advocated becomes. I think an often unspoken assump-
tion of a great deal of work in truth-conditional semantics in the tra-
dition of generative grammar is that the language faculty, in what-
ever sense is relevant, is broader than the very stark version offered 
by faculty of human language–narrow sense from Hauser, Chomsky, 
and Fitch.11 Though fully deciding what goes into a narrow or broad 
language faculty is no easy task, Pietroski’s option is much more likely 
to fi t with a strong minimalist view.
Of course, knowing what really goes into the language faculty (nar-
row or broad) as opposed to related aspects of cognition, is no easy task. 
Hence, I think the diffi culty in fi nding clear markers of the practical 
difference between Pietroski’s proposal and mine is not so surprising. 
If we knew better how to probe for what is in the language faculty, per-
haps clearer answers would be forthcoming.12
11 Sometimes this is clearly articulated. See, for instance Larson and Segal 
(1995) and Ludlow (2011).
12 But, for some thoughts about this, see Crain, Gualmini, and Pietroski (2005) 
and Pietroski and Crain (2012).
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Absent that, I suppose we are speculating, based on what looks like 
good data and successful theories. My speculations go in a rather less 
minimal direction, while Pietroski’s go more minimal. Mine go more op-
timistic about the value of familiar truth-conditional apparatus, his go 
rather more pessimistic. There are some clearer disagreements about 
tools and some specifi c data, but they are highly specifi c, and somewhat 
project-internal disagreements. To end again with the builders meta-
phor, we could forgive our client from having trouble seeing just what 
for them the difference comes to. Absent a sharper understanding of 
the language faculty, that difference remains elusive.
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